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Abstract 
This is the first paper to analyze the impact of biofuels on the price transmission along the food 
chain. We analyze the U.S. corn sector and its vertical links with food and ethanol (energy) 
markets. We find that biofuels affect the price transmission elasticity in the food chain compared 
to a no biofuel production situation but the effect depends on the source of the market shock and 
the policy regime: the price transmission elasticity declines under a binding blender’s tax credit 
and a food market shock. Our results also indicate that the response of corn and food prices to 
shocks in the corn and/or food markets is lower in the presence of biofuels. Finally, the 
sensitivity analyses indicate that our results are robust to different assumptions about the model 
parameters. 
 
Key words: price transmission, food chain, biofuels, prices  
JEL classification: Q11, Q21
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Biofuels and Vertical Price Transmission: The Case of the U.S. Corn, Ethanol, 
and Food Markets 
1. Introduction 
A renewed interest in the issue of price transmission among researchers and policy 
makers stems from two sources. First, the recent structural changes in food and retail sectors 
have led to higher concentration of these sectors. Second, the global agricultural commodity and 
energy prices have surged recently, increasing not only the price levels but also volatility. The 
pass-through of the price shocks from world to domestic markets and from agricultural 
commodities to food prices can have significant income distributional and welfare implications. 
Especially, poor consumers are adversely affected by the rise in food prices and farmers’ real 
incomes depend heavily on commodity prices; this makes the issue of price transmission very 
relevant from the political economy perspective.  
The transmission of changes from commodity to food prices and vice versa varies by 
commodity, the time span considered, and country. These factors have been well documented in 
the rich literature on the topic (e.g., Gardner 1975; Reagan and Weitzman 1982; Kinnucan and 
Forker 1987; Ball and Mankiw 1994; McCorriston et al. 1998; von Cramon-Taubadel 1998, 
Azzam 1999; Gohin and Guyomard 2000; McCorriston et al. 2001; Lloyd et al. 2006; Nakajima, 
2011; Rezitis and Reziti 2011; Rajcaniova and Pokrivcak 2013). The general finding of the 
literature is that changes in the relative prices in one market are transmitted to other markets in 
the agri-food chain through input-output linkages between vertically integrated up- and 
downstream industries.  
Structural models of price transmission between the farm and the retail sector date back 
to the seminal paper by Gardner (1975) who derived price transition elasticities under the 
assumption of perfect competition in the food industry. This pioneering work was followed by 
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McCorriston et al. (1998) who incorporated oligopolistic competition in the food industry into 
Gardner (1975)’s model. They showed that the degree of price transmission from producer to 
consumer prices is reduced (smaller pass-through of a change in the producer price to the 
consumer price) when the food sector enjoys market power. In their model, under quite general 
conditions, consumers do not fully benefit from the decrease in producer prices when the food 
sector is not perfectly competitive, meaning that the food sector uses its power to lower the 
degree of price transmission to its own benefit. On the backdrop of the BSE food scare in the 
UK, Lloyd et al (2006) studied how retailers’ market power affects the price transmission. They 
conclude that the market power of retailers prevented full pass-through of the decline in the 
producer price of beef, caused by food scare, to consumers. 
McCorriston et al. (2001), however, show that in addition to market power, the 
economies of scale affect the magnitude of the price transmission elasticity. Under plausible 
conditions, economies of scale can offset the impact of market power and lead to even higher 
price transmission than under the perfect competition; thus when the price decreases, consumers 
can benefit more relative to perfect competition.    
Despite the numerous studies on the issue of price transmission in the agri-food supply 
chain, we are not aware of any that would analyze either theoretically or empirically the impact 
of the recent phenomenon of biofuels on the price transmission. This topic appears to be of high 
importance given the significant impact biofuels’ expansion on the world agricultural commodity 
markets (e.g., de Gorter and Just 2008, 2009a; Ciaian and Kancs 2011; Drabik 2011; Serra et al. 
2011; Yano et al. 2010;  Zilberman et al., 2013; de Gorter et al. 2013). In the period 2000 – 2010, 
world biofuel production increased almost six-fold1 and a significant share of corn, sugar cane 
and oilseeds production is used to produce fuel rather than food. Several studies have shown that 
                                                 
1 http://www.earth-policy.org/data_center/C26 
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the surge in biofuel production is the major cause of the recent spikes in the global grains and 
oilseed prices and that a strong and direct link between energy and commodity prices has been 
created (e.g., Wright 2011; Mallory et al. 2012; de Gorter et al. 2013).  
In this paper, we ask and provide an answer to a simple question: Has the introduction of 
biofuels (corn ethanol) change the price transmission between the agricultural commodity (corn) 
and food markets? We analyze the U.S. corn sector and its vertical links to food and ethanol 
markets. We consider the following biofuel policy regimes: (1) a binding blend mandate (with or 
without a tax credit), (2) a binding blender's tax credit, and (3) no biofuel policy (but positive 
biofuel production). These three policy regimes are compared to our benchmark which is no 
biofuel production. The blend mandate and blender’s tax credit are the most relevant policies 
used in the United States, and other countries alike, to support biofuel production. Although 
biofuel production has been stimulated by heavy government support, under certain conditions it 
can also occur without biofuel policies; therefore no biofuel policy is the third policy regime 
evaluated in this paper. The price transmission between agricultural and food prices is evaluated 
for exogenous shocks in: (1) domestic corn supply, (2) corn exports, and (3) domestic demand 
for food.  
In the rest of the paper, we first theoretically derive price transmission elasticities for 
each policy regime and an exogenous market shock. To that end, we build a tractable partial 
equilibrium model where corn is used to produce food (and feed) and ethanol; corn is also 
exported abroad. As in Gardner (1975), we consider a competitive food industry, but we do not 
explicitly include marketing services into production function of food.2 We focus on the impact 
of biofuels on the price transmission rather than on the impact of the substitution of food for 
                                                 
2 Including additional variable into the food production function would complicate the exposition without providing 
additional insights. 
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marketing services on price transmission. The corn market is vertically linked to a food industry 
that produces final goods for consumers. The retail sector is not considered in our paper. When 
ethanol production is introduced, corn prices become linked to ethanol prices through a zero 
profit condition as in de Gorter and Just (2008), Drabik (2011), and Mallory et al (2012).    
Next, we calibrate the theoretical model to the U.S. data for 2009 to quantify the price 
transmission elasticities. Finally, in order to identify the robustness of the results, we vary the 
key model parameters using Monte Carlo simulations with 5000 random draws from parameters’ 
intervals. 
We find that biofuels indeed affect the price transmission elasticity in the food chain, but 
only in some shock- and regime-specific conditions. More precisely, if the exogenous market 
shock stems in the corn market, then the price transmission elasticity does not depend on the 
policy regime and is equal to the transmission elasticity under no biofuel production. However, if 
the shock comes from the food market, then the transmission elasticity declines relative to no 
biofuel production scenario when the blender’s tax credit determines the ethanol price, but there 
is no difference under a binding mandate. We explain in the paper that these differences originate 
in different effects of a biofuel policies on price formation. Our results also indicate that the 
response of corn and food prices to shocks in the corn and/or food markets is lower in the 
presence of biofuels. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop a 
theoretical partial equilibrium model capturing all relevant features of the corn, fuel and energy 
markets, and we derive formulas for price transmission elasticities for individual market shocks 
and policy regimes. Section 3 describes the data and the calibration procedure used. In Section 4, 
we present our results based on the central estimates of the Monte Carlo simulations. The last 
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section provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical Model 
We develop an analytical model for the corn sector and its vertical linkages with food and 
ethanol markets to analyze price transmission elasticities under several settings. In order to better 
identify the direct impact of biofuels on the price transmission along the food chain, we abstract 
from modeling the linkages of the fuel market with the food sector (e.g., through higher 
transportation costs) and with the corn sector in the form of changing input costs for corn 
production. 
In our benchmark scenario, entitled no biofuel, corn and ethanol markets are delinked and 
only the corn-food market chain is considered. The food market is represented by a competitive 
processing sector which buys and processes corn and sells corn-based food to final consumers. 
We then analyze how the benchmark price transmission elasticity is affected by biofuel 
production which creates a direct link between corn and ethanol prices and quantities. In addition 
to the no biofuel benchmark, in this section we consider three policy regimes: (1) a binding blend 
mandate, (2) a binding blender's tax credit, and (3) no biofuel policy.3 The first two policy 
regimes correspond to biofuel policies historically used in the United States. The link between 
corn and ethanol prices when ethanol is produced is modeled as in de Gorter and Just (2008), 
Drabik (2011), and Mallory et al. (2012). 
The No Biofuel Benchmark 
In the absence of ethanol production,4 the total U.S. corn supply,  C CS P , at price PC  is 
used for (i) domestic food (e.g., corn syrup) and feed production (e.g., feed for hogs), 
                                                 
3 In the empirical section, we also consider the combination of a binding mandate with a blender's tax credit. 
Because the qualitative results for this policy regime are the same as for the mandate alone, we do not elaborate on 
the combination of a mandate with the tax credit in this section. 
4 The term "no ethanol production" is not a synonym for "no ethanol policy". It is because under some conditions, 
specified in the section No Biofuel Policy, ethanol production can occur even without any biofuel policy. 
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collectively denoted by x, and (ii) exports, with the export demand curve facing the U.S. corn 
market denoted by  CD P . The equilibrium in the corn market thus requires   
(1)                                                   1 2, ,C C CS P Z x D P Z   
where Zi , i = {1, 2}, denotes an exogenous shifter of the corn supply curve (e.g., due to the 
2011/12 drought in the United States) and of the foreign corn demand (e.g., higher incomes in 
the rest of the world), respectively. There are no shocks in the initial equilibrium, hence we set Z1 
= Z2 = 0. A positive shock implies a rightward shift in a supply or a demand curve. 
Domestic corn is processed by a competitive industry into food/feed according to a well-
behaved production function  f x , i.e., the function satisfies:  0 0f  , 0xf  , and 0xxf  . 
The subscript denotes the derivative of the production function with respect to the argument.  
Denoting  fD p as the demand for food at price p and Z3 as an exogenous food demand 
shifter (e.g., due to higher incomes or population growth), the equilibrium in the food market is 
given by 
(2)                                                          3,fD p Z f x   
The first-order condition for profit maximization in the food processing industry 
implicitly defines the demand for corn 
(3)                                                               x Cpf P  
Totally differentiating the system of equations (1) through (3), we arrive at  
(4)                                      
  1 2
3
1 2
3
C CCP P C CZ Z
fp fZ x
x xx C
S D dP S dZ dx D dZ
D dp D dZ f dx
f dp pf dx dP
   
 
 
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where the subscripts on the market supply and demand curves denote partial derivatives with 
respect to individual arguments. With the system of equations (4), we are in a position to derive 
price transmission elasticities in the absence of ethanol production pertaining to individual 
market shocks.  
 A shock in the corn supply of dZ1 (dZ2= dZ3 = 0) changes the corn price by 1CdP dZ  and 
the food price by 1dp dZ . Following McCorriston et al. (2001), we calculate the price 
transmission elasticity, 
1Z
 , of a shock in the corn supply as5 
(5)                                                
1
1
1
C C
Z
C C
p P dp dZ P
P p dP dZ p
                                                     
 Setting dZ3 = 0 in the second equation of the system (4), and solving the system for  
1dp dZ  obtains 
(6)                                                  2
1 1
x C
x xx fp
dp f dP
dZ f pf D dZ
                                              
Substituting expression (6) into the formula (5), using the expression for the term xxf derived in 
Appendix 1, invoking that x Cf P p  (from equation (3)), and converting the price derivative 
fpD  into its elasticity form ( Dfp f fD D p ), we obtain 
(7)                                                       
1
1
S
fNB
Z S D
f f
                                                        
Where Sf  denotes a price elasticity of food supply (derived in Appendix 2), and Df  is a price 
elasticity of food demand. 
 Applying an analogous procedure, we obtain an identical expression for the price 
                                                 
5 The change in the corn price is in the denominator because the primary effect of the corn supply shock is to affect 
the corn price, which in turn has an effect also on the food price. 
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transmission elasticity of a shock in the foreign corn export demand,
2Z
  
(8)                                             
2
2
2
1
S
fNB C
Z S D
C f f
dp dZ P
dP dZ p
                                          
Intuitively, elasticities (7) and (8) are expected to be identical because the shock occurs in the 
same (corn) market and leads to the same corn price change. It should, however, be noted that 
the elasticity formulas in this theoretical section are derived using marginal analysis and 
therefore might differ from the empirical results, especially for non-marginal shocks. 
The price transmission elasticity 
3Z
  relates to the price shock in the food market (due to 
a shift in the food demand curve), which causes a subsequent change in the corn price (see 
Appendix 3 for details) 
(9)                                     
3
3
3
1
S
fNB C
Z S S D
C f C C
dP dZ p
dp dZ P
                                     
where SC  and DC  denote elasticities of the corn supply and export demand curves, respectively, 
and C CP S pf   and C CP D pf   denote the shares of the value of corn supply and corn 
exports, respectively, in the value of food production. 
 A close inspection of elasticities (7), (8), and (9) shows that the transmission elasticity 
stemming from a shock in the corn market can be smaller, equal, or greater than the elasticity of 
a food demand shock, depending on the relative supply and demand elasticities and value shares. 
For example, a shock in the corn market results in smaller transmission elasticity than the shock 
in the food market as long as D D Sf C C    . Empirically, we find the transmission elasticities 
under no ethanol production (benchmark) to be equal to 0.84 and 0.61 for the corn and food 
market shocks, respectively (see further).    
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Binding Blend Mandate6 
Under a binding blend mandate α, ethanol has to constitute at least α[x100] percent of the 
final fuel blend. The fuel (blend of ethanol and gasoline) price, PF, is equal to the weighted 
average of the ethanol and gasoline prices, PE and PG, respectively, adjusted for the fuel tax, t, 
and the ethanol tax credit, tc, (if any) (de Gorter and Just 2009b; Drabik 2011)  
(10)                                         1F E c GP P t t P t                                      
The term λ = 0.7, denotes miles per gallon of ethanol relative to gasoline (de Gorter and Just 
2008), and is used to consistently convert all prices and quantities into gasoline energy-
equivalent terms (Cui et al. 2011; Lapan and Moschini 2012). 
 The zero marginal profit condition for ethanol production implies a link between corn 
and ethanol prices (de Gorter and Just 2008; Drabik 2011, Lapan and Moschini 2012) 
(11)                                                      01C EP P cr

                                             
where β = 2.8 denotes gallons of ethanol per bushel of corn (Eidman 2007); r denotes the relative 
price of Dried Distillers Grains with Solubles (DDGS)7 and corn; γ = 17/56 is the share of DDGS 
per bushel of corn; and c0 denotes (constant) processing cost per gasoline energy-equivalent 
gallon of ethanol. 
 The ethanol supply curve SE is determined by the horizontal difference between corn 
supply and demand for corn for domestic food/feed use and corn exports 
(12)                                       1 2, ,1E E C C CS P S P Z x D P Zr

                                  
                                                 
6 Although the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) stipulates a quantitative mandate for ethanol, in practice it is 
implemented as a blend mandate. Therefore, we do not analyze price transmission elasticities under a quantity 
mandate. 
7 DDGS, a valuable co-product of ethanol production, is returned into the corn market and is used for feeding 
animals. Drabik (2011) provides details on the economics of this co-product and further explanation of equation 
(12).  
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In the presence of ethanol production, the term x does not represent solely yellow corn (as it was 
the case in the previous section where ethanol was not produced) but rather the corn-equivalent 
quantity of corn and DDGS that is used in food production. This does not pose a problem for our 
analysis as we measure the food production and associated corn inputs in dollar terms. The dollar 
value makes it possible to accommodate a possibly separate use of DDGS (e.g., as a hog feed, 
where the pork is subsequently counted as food) and yellow corn (e.g., directly used for pop-
corn) for food production.   
For later use, we write the corn use identity as  
(13)                                                         
E
C CS x D S                                                           
where ECS  denotes the amount of corn initially
8 allocated to ethanol production. Identity (13) can 
be converted into 
(14)                                                         CP x
pf
                                                      
where EC CP S pf  denotes the share of the value of corn diverted to ethanol in the value of food 
production. 
  The equilibrium in the ethanol market requires that ethanol supply be equal to ethanol 
demand; the latter is proportional to the fuel demand 
(15)                                                         E E F FS P D P                                                  
 Total fuel demand has to also equal total fuel supply 
(16)                                                     F F G G E ED P S P S P                                            
                                                 
8 We stress the word initially because this is not the final quantity of yellow corn used in ethanol production. It is 
because ethanol production yields DDGS as a co-product which is almost a perfect substitute for yellow corn for 
animal feed. Therefore, the yellow corn that DDGS replaces can be further used for ethanol production.   
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Total differentiation of equations (2), (3), (10), (11), (15), and (16) (with the substitution 
identity (12) into equations (15) and (16)), yields                                                                               
(17)                  
 
 
 
3
1 2
1 2
3
1 2
1 2
1
F C C
F G C C
fp fZ x
x xx C
F E G
C E
FP F CP P C CZ Z
FP F GP G CP P C CZ Z
D dp D dZ f dx
f dp pf dx dP
dP dP dP
dP kdP
D dP k S D dP kS dZ kdx kD dZ
D dP S dP k S D dP kS dZ kdx kD dZ
 

 
 
  

    
     
  
where we use a short-hand notation  1k r   , and the prime (') to denote the derivative 
with respect to a sole argument. 
 Because the first two equations in the system (17) are identical to the last two equations 
in system (4), it must be that the functional forms of the transmission elasticities with blend 
mandate (denoted by the superscript BM) related to the supply/foreign demand shocks in the 
corn market are the same 
(18)                                                 
1 2
1
S
fBM BM
Z Z S D
f f
                                                        
The magnitudes of elasticities in (18) in general differ from their counterparts with no corn-
ethanol linkage in (7) and (8). The reason is that both sets of elasticities pertain to different 
market equilibria.9 However, the difference will be rather small and we expect almost equal 
elasticities with and without ethanol.  
 The price transmission elasticity for the shock in the food demand under the blend 
mandate takes the form (for derivation see Appendix 3) 
                                                 
9 This point is explained in a greater detail in the section on data and calibration. 
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(19)                                     3 1
S
fBM
Z
S S D S D F
f C C G F
G
P
m P
     
 
  
                 
where EF E C CP S P S  , and  1S DFG F
G
Pm
P
     ; SG  and DF denote gasoline supply and fuel 
demand elasticities, respectively.  
 Formula (19)  differs from formula (9) by a term which captures the parameters of the 
fuel market. Since the term is positive, the transmission elasticity for a food demand shock under 
a blend mandate should generally be smaller than the transmission elasticity with no biofuels. 
Note, however, that because the market equilibria corresponding to formulas (9) and (19) are not 
the same, the magnitudes of the (endogenous) terms ϕ and ρ differ between the formulas, making 
the two elasticities not exactly comparable. In fact, in Table 2 below we show that the 
transmission elasticity related to the food demand shock is empirically found to be slightly 
higher under the mandate relative to the no biofuel benchmark (see further).  
Binding Blender’s Tax credit   
Because under a binding blender's tax credit, fuel consumers are not mandated to 
consume ethanol, they will only do so if the consumer price of ethanol, inclusive of the reduced 
tax due to the tax credit (tc), is the same as the consumer price of gasoline, i.e., PG + t (de Gorter 
and Just 2008; Cui et al. 2011; Lapan and Moschini 2012). For the market price of ethanol, we 
then have 
(20)                                                   1 1 cE G
tP P t 
                                                    
And the consumer fuel price is given by 
(21)                                                             F GP P t                                                               
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Totally differentiating the system of equations (2), (3), (20), (21), (11), and (16) (with the 
substitution of equation (12) into (16)), which constitute the market equilibrium under a binding 
tax credit, we arrive at  
(22)                   
 
3
1 2
3
1 2F G C C
fp fZ x
x xx C
E G
F G
C E
FP F GP G CP P C CZ Z
D dp D dZ f dx
f dp pf dx dP
dP dP
dP dP
dP kdP
D dP S dP k S D dP kS dZ kdx kD dZ
 
 



     
  
The first two equations in the system (22) are the same as the last two equations in (4), 
hence the expressions for the price transmission elasticity of shocks in the corn market must be 
the same as in the case of no biofuels and with a binding blend mandate 
(23)                                                  
1 2
1
S
fTC TC
Z Z S D
f f
                                                      
where the super script TC denotes the case of a tax credit. 
The price transmission elasticity of a shock in the food demand under the tax credit is 
given by (for derivation see Appendix 3) 
(24)                                     3 1
S
fTC
Z
S S D S D
f C C G F
     
 
   
                             
where F G G EP S P S  and G F G EP D P S  .  
 The last term in the denominator in equation (24),  S DG F    , is unambiguously 
positive which implies that the price transmission elasticity with the binding tax credit should 
generally be smaller than the elasticity with no biofuel. For the extreme case of a perfectly elastic 
gasoline supply and/or fuel demand curve, the expression (24) reduces to zero, 
3
0TCZ  . In this 
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case, the corn price does not respond to food demand shocks; the corn price is directly linked to 
the exogenous gasoline price - through the ethanol price given in (20) - and is thus insensitive to 
any shock in the food market. This implies that the linkage between corn and ethanol markets 
makes the corn price less responsive to food price changes when the tax credit is binding.  
No Biofuel Policy 
 Corn ethanol production can also take place without biofuel policy. This is possible in 
several cases. First, with increased corn productivity the availability of crop may expand, leading 
to lower feedstock prices thus making ethanol production profitable even in the absence of 
biofuel policy. Second, if gasoline prices are sufficiently high, then the free market ethanol price 
increases according to equation (20) (with the tax credit set to zero as is the case with no biofuel 
policy), thus potentially making ethanol production profitable. Third, a technological change can 
also result in ethanol production without a policy. Consider, for example, a decrease in the 
ethanol processing cost, co, due to lower natural gas prices. (Natural gas takes up the highest 
share of the corn ethanol processing cost). Then, as equation (11) indicates, the price of corn that 
the ethanol industry is willing to pay increases (because of higher probability of ethanol 
production) for a given ethanol price leading to free market ethanol production. A higher 
extraction rate for ethanol from corn, the term β in equation (11), and a higher price of DDGS 
relative to corn (the term r in the same equation) have a similar effect on the corn price. 
In all cases above, the consumer is not mandated to consume ethanol and will do so only 
when the final price of ethanol per mile is lower than the final price of gasoline. Hence, this is 
the same case as for the tax credit (for tc = 0). Therefore, the model set-up for the market 
equilibrium with the tax credit (set to zero) applies for the no biofuel policy case as well. 
Consequently, the formulas for price transmission elasticities are the same as well. The binding 
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tax credit and the no biofuel policy scenarios differ in the size of the ethanol sector. With tax 
credit the ethanol sector is expected to be larger because the tax credit increases the ethanol 
prices, leading to higher ethanol production.  
3. Data and Calibration 
 We calibrate the model to the data describing the U.S. corn, food, and fuel markets in 
2009. The demand and supply curves exhibit constant price elasticity. We adopt some 
parameters and raw data from a well established paper by Cui et al. (2011) as their corn-ethanol 
model is also calibrated to the year 2009. We provide an explanation for cases when our data 
differ from theirs. A self explanatory documentation of the data used is presented in Appendix 5. 
All fuel price and quantity data are converted into gasoline energy-equivalents to consistently 
model the linkages in the fuel market.  
 Two principal corn ethanol policies were in place in the United States in 2009: the 
blender’s tax credit and the blending (share) mandate. Because only one biofuel policy can 
determine the biofuel price at a time (de Gorter and Just 2009b), it is crucial to determine the 
binding policy in order to properly calibrate the model. Cui et al (2011) calibrate their model to 
the blender’s tax credit arguing (in footnote 36) that “because ethanol production for 2009 
exceeds the mandate level, […] the mandate does not bind, and […] it is the fuel tax and ethanol 
subsidy policies that affect equilibrium values”. However, de Gorter and Just (2010) show that 
the comparison of the observed quantity of ethanol with the mandated level does not reliably 
determine which policy is binding and argue for comparing the observed ethanol market price 
with what the price would be if the tax credit were binding. de Gorter and Just (2010)’s empirical 
analysis shows that the binding policy in 2009 was the mandate.10 Thus, we calibrate our model 
                                                 
10 An indication that the blender’s tax credit was not a binding policy in 2009 is the gasoline price. Cui et al. (2011) 
calculate it to be $2.11/gallon which is 35 cents more than the observed wholesale price of $1.76/gallon. 
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to a binding mandate combined with a tax credit; we refer to this model as the baseline.  
 The upper part of Appendix 5 presents parameters that describe the link between corn and 
ethanol prices and quantities; we also recognize that one gallon of corn ethanol yields only 
approximately 70 percent of the mileage compared to gasoline. The returns-to-scale parameter of 
the food production function is estimated to be ε = 0.33 which corresponds to the food supply 
elasticity of Sf = 0.48 (Appendix 4). 
 As explained above, the blend mandate of α = 5.7 energy percent is the binding biofuel 
policy in our model. To be consistent with observed market data, we calculate the mandate as the 
share of the (energy) amount of ethanol in the (energy) amount of total fuel. In 2009, a corn 
ethanol blender’s tax credit of $0.45/gallon and the (federal plus state average) gasoline tax of 
$0.39/gallon were also in place. 
 The gasoline and ethanol wholesale (rack) prices come from Omaha, Nebraska. The price 
of fuel (a blend of ethanol and gasoline) is equal to the weighted average of ethanol and gasoline 
prices adjusted for the fuel tax and the tax credit and amounts to $2.17 per gasoline energy-
equivalent gallon (GEEG). Corn and ethanol prices are linked through a zero marginal profit 
condition for ethanol production. The price of food is normalized to unity which makes it 
possible to use the dollar value of the food production as the food quantity. 
 The U.S. ethanol production (equal to consumption in our model) in 2009 amounted to 
10.76 billion gallons (corresponding to 7.53 billion GEEGs), and the total fuel (i.e., gasoline plus 
ethanol) consumption was 134.74 billion gallons. Therefore, the gasoline consumption equals 
134.74 - 10.76 = 123.61 billion gallons, making the total fuel consumption in energy terms be 
equal to 131.14 GEEGs. 
 Corresponding to the 10.76 billion gallons of ethanol is 2.84 billion bushels of yellow 
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corn; this estimate does, however, not take into account the amount of the ethanol co-product, 
DDGS (Dried Distillers Grains with Solubles) that is returned to the corn market. Taking the 
DDGS into consideration, the total quantity of yellow corn diverted to ethanol production is 3.84 
billion bushels. The difference between 3.84 billion bushels and 2.84 billion bushels thus gives 
the amount DDGS placed on the market. Following Hoffman and Baker (2011), we assume 81 
percent of DDGS is consumed domestically and the rest is exported. 
  The total yellow corn supply in the United States in 2009 was 13.15 billion bushels, of 
which 1.86 billion bushels were exported. We estimate the quantity of yellow corn used in 
food/feed as the residual after the export and ethanol markets have been satisfied, that is, 13.15 – 
3.84 – 1.86 = 7.45 billion bushels. However, the total amount of corn equivalent used in the 
food/feed sector is equal to 7.45 + 0.81x1.00 = 8.26 billion bushels, reflecting that 81 percent of 
DDGS stayed in the domestic market in 2009. An analogous adjustment has been made for the 
corn-equivalent amount of exports. 
 We use the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) from the U.S. Census Bureau to 
estimate the value of food production that is related to corn.11 The total value of food production 
(where corn is used) is $94.85 billion. The list of items included in this amount is presented in 
Table 1. Because more than 80 percent of U.S. corn ethanol plants are dry mills due to lower 
capital costs,12 we do not include products of wet milling into the value of food production.  
Demand and supply elasticities play an important role in our analysis. We use the central 
estimates for elasticities of corn supply, foreign corn import demand, and gasoline supply as 
reported in Cui et al. (2011); the lower and upper limits for the sensitivity analysis are also very 
similar (see the bottom part of Appendix 5) to Cui et al. (2011)’s. The elasticity of food/feed 
                                                 
11 http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/asm/historical_data/index.html  
12 http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_production.html  
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corn demand is calculated as per equation (A4.6) and is equal to -0.23, which is very close to the 
value reported by Cui et al. (2011) (-0.20).  
The elasticity of food demand comes from Seale et al. (2003) and is equal to -0.09, which 
is consistent with the empirical observation that demand for food is very inelastic. Central 
estimate of the fuel demand elasticity of -0.26 comes from Hamilton (2009), and the lower and 
upper limits reflect the low and upper estimates of the recent meta-analysis by Havránek et al. 
(2012).  
4. Simulation Results 
We use the baseline parameters to construct equilibria for the no biofuel benchmark and 
four policy regimes: (1) a binding mandate combined with a tax credit (the baseline), (2) a 
binding mandate alone, (3) a binding blender’s tax credit, and (4) no biofuel policy.  
In the benchmark and each regime, similar as in the theoretical section, we (separately) 
introduce exogenous shocks in corn supply, domestic and foreign corn demand, denoted as Z1, 
Z2, and Z3, respectively, to calculate price transmission elasticities related to each shock. The 
magnitude of each shock is equal to 10 percent of the consumption/production corresponding to 
the no-shock case. Thus, for example, the (negative) corn supply shock under the binding tax 
credit regime is equal to 10 percent of the corn supply in the shock-free equilibrium for that 
policy regime. The price transmission elasticities are then calculated from the simulated changes 
in corn and food prices relative to the no-shock prices.   
We perform a Monte Carlo analysis to check the robustness of our results to the 
exogenous elasticities. To that end, we vary elasticities of corn supply, foreign corn import 
demand, food demand, fuel demand, and gasoline supply. We make 5000 random draws for each 
of the elasticities from a beta distribution whose parameters are derived from the lower, central, 
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and upper values of the elasticities specified in Appendix 5, using the PERT method (Davis 
2008).  
Price transmission elasticities 
Table 2 presents a summary of results for the price transmission elasticities obtained from 
Monte Carlo simulations. We focus our discussion on the central estimates of the transmission 
elasticities (the heavy font). For corn market shocks (Z1 and Z2) in the no biofuel benchmark, the 
price transmission elasticity is 0.84, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the corn price causes 
an 8.4 percent increase in the price of food. On the other hand, for the food demand shock (Z3) 
we estimate a smaller price transmission: a 10 percent increase in the price of food has corn 
prices increase only by 6.1 percent. The price transmission from the corn market to the food 
market is greater than the other way around because we consider larger elasticities of corn supply 
and export demand relative to the elasticity of food demand which causes smaller corn price 
responses than food price responses to a given shock (see Appendix 5 and equations (7), (8), and 
(9)).13  
For the binding mandate (with or without the tax credit), the price transmission 
elasticities corresponding to individual shocks are very similar to the benchmark elasticities. To 
understand this stability, it is important to note that at the current mandate levels the ethanol 
market – the only link in our model between corn and food markets on the one hand and the 
gasoline market on the other – is small relative to the gasoline market. As a result, the simulated 
market shocks have a minimal impact on the fuel price which, in connection with inelastic fuel 
demand, implies minimal changes in the fuel consumption. Therefore, given the blend mandate – 
implemented as a fixed share of ethanol in the fuel consumption – the amounts of ethanol and 
                                                 
13 From equations (7), (8), and (9) it follows that for a sufficiently low elasticity of corn supply and/or export 
demand (everything else held equal), the food-corn price transmission elasticity will equal or exceed the corn-food 
price transmission elasticity. 
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corn dedicated to ethanol production are not very sensitive to the market shocks. Under the 
binding mandate, the effects of the market shocks mostly materialize in the allocation of the 
residual amount of corn for non-ethanol uses. For example, the more the corn supply contracts 
(e.g., due to bad weather), the less corn is available for domestic food/feed use and for exports14 
but the amount of corn for ethanol does not change much.  
Since for a given mandate the amount of ethanol does not response significantly to the 
market shocks, the corn price is effectively determined in the corn market.15 In order to produce 
the mandated quantity of ethanol, ethanol producers need to pay for corn at least as much as the 
food sector is willing to pay. This mechanism of price formation under the mandate means that 
biofuels do not significantly affect the price transmission of shocks between corn and food 
prices. A change in the food (corn) price will be transmitted to the corn (food) price at the same 
rate both with the binding mandate and with no biofuels. This is documented by almost identical 
transmission elasticities in the first three columns in Table 2.  
We observe a partially different result structure when the tax credit is binding (or when 
biofuels are produced without any biofuel policy). A significant effect of biofuels on price 
transmission along food chain occurs with the food demand shock, in which case the price 
transmission elasticity decreases significantly as compared to the no biofuel benchmark – a 
decrease from 0.61 to 0.35 (Table 2). The elasticities associated with the remaining shocks are 
largely the same as in the benchmark case.  
With the binding tax credit (or no biofuel policy), consumers are not mandated to 
consume ethanol. They will only do so if the consumer price of ethanol, inclusive of the reduced 
                                                 
14 The allocation between the two corn uses depends on relative demand elasticities of the food/feed and export 
demand curves. 
15 The corn price would be completely determined in the corn market if the mandate were implemented as a fixed 
quantity mandate. 
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tax due to the tax credit is lower than the consumer price of gasoline. This implies that under a 
binding tax credit the corn price is determined by the gasoline price (through the ethanol price) 
and not in the corn market as it was the case under the binding mandate. Consequently, a shock 
in the food market will affect the corn price only to the extent to which it can affect the gasoline 
price. Given the small size of the ethanol market relative to the gasoline market, the price 
transmission from the food to corn market is also small. 
For a shock originating in the corn market, the price transmission is not affected by 
biofuels because, as explained earlier, biofuels do not affect the price linkages in the processing 
or food markets, hence any change in the corn price is transmitted to the food price at the same 
magnitude with or without biofuels. 
In order to identify the effects of the exogenous model elasticities on the price 
transmission elasticities, we regress (separately for each shock and scenario) the transmission 
elasticities obtained from the 5000 simulations on corn supply, foreign corn import demand, food 
demand, fuel demand, and gasoline supply elasticities. To ease the interpretation of the results, 
the demand elasticities were converted into positive values in all regressions.  
The results in Table 3 show that the food demand elasticity is by far the strongest 
determinant of price transmission elasticities for corn market shocks. The corn supply elasticity 
affects the transmission elasticities most in the case of the food market shock. For most shocks 
and scenarios, the price transmission elasticities increase with the elasticities of corn supply and 
foreign corn demand. The only exception is the food demand shock in which case the 
relationship is reversed (Table 3). This is because the formula for the price transmission 
elasticity for a food demand shock is the reciprocal of the formulas for other elasticities.  
The sensitivity analysis for the fuel demand and the gasoline supply elasticities shows 
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some heterogeneity across shocks and model scenarios. For each of the shocks, the price 
transmission elasticities do not respond statistically significantly to the changes in fuel 
demand/gasoline supply elasticities when the mandate is binding (Table 3). For all other cases, 
fuel demand/gasoline supply elasticities generally do significantly affect the magnitude of price 
transmission elasticities. This heterogeneity is due to the different ways – described above – 
through which the shocks are transmitted to and interact with the fuel market and corn market.   
Price level changes 
In addition to analyzing how biofuel policies affect the price transmission, which is a 
ratio of two relative measures, it is also important to investigate to what extent biofuels affect the  
price changes under various market shocks. To that end, in Table 4 we report a summary of 
percentage changes in food and corn prices for the benchmark and four policy regimes. We focus 
on the central estimates of these changes. 
Corn ethanol’s impact on the magnitude of the corn and food price responses to market 
shocks strongly depends on the biofuel policy. Compared to the no biofuel scenario, both food 
and corn price responses are not affected significantly when the mandate is binding. These 
results are similar to price transmission elasticities reported in Table 2 where biofuels did not 
affect price transmission when mandate was the binding policy.  
However, when the tax credit is binding (or when the free market would support biofuel 
production), both food and corn price changes are lower relative to the no biofuel scenario for 
the corn and food market shocks Z1, Z2 and Z3. This is in contrast to the price transmission 
elasticities reported in Table 2, where the transmission elasticity was reduced by biofuels only 
for the food price shock. The reason is that fuel market absorbs (through biofuels) the major 
share of corn price shocks. With the tax credit or in the absence of biofuel policies the corn price 
25 
 
is determined by the gasoline price. Because ethanol’s share in the total fuel is small, corn and/or 
food market shocks have a limited impact on the gasoline price, thus making the corn price 
responding little to the shocks. As derived in the theoretical analysis, in an extreme situation with 
a perfectly elastic gasoline supply or fuel demand curves, the corn price response to any corn or 
food market shocks is zero, implying that also the food price change is reduced significantly 
relative to the no biofuel situation. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The rise of the biofuel sector has created an important outlet for agricultural 
commodities. For example, biofuel production absorbs a significant amount of corn, sugarcane, 
wheat, sugar beet, and oilseeds. The increasing interdependence between the primary agricultural 
markets and energy markets may reduce the dependence of agricultural production on food 
markets, which in turn may reduce the price responsiveness along the whole agri-food chain. As 
a result, the income distributional effects of the agricultural support measures may change along 
the agri-food chain as well. 
The results of this paper show that biofuels do affect the price transmission along the 
food chain but their effect depends on the biofuel policy and the type of an exogenous market 
shock. Compared to a situation of no biofuel production, biofuels reduce the price transmission 
elasticity when the blender’s tax credit is binding. In this case, biofuels reduce the price 
transmission from food to corn but not vice versa. The corn price is more rigid when corn is 
linked to the fuel market through the tax credit because it is locked on to the gasoline price and 
thus can be affected to a lesser extent by shocks coming from food market. On the other hand, 
biofuels do not affect price formation in the food market; for this reason biofuels do not affect 
26 
 
the price transmission from corn-to-food. Further, our results show that when the mandate is 
binding, biofuels do not impact the price transmission along the food chain. 
A second impact of biofuels is on the magnitude of corn and food price responses to 
shocks occurring in the corn and food markets. Our results indicate that the response of corn and 
food prices to exogenous market shocks is smaller in the presence of biofuels, indicating that – in 
some situations – biofuels may reduce volatility in food markets. This will be the case when the 
tax credit is binding. In this case, most of the shock in the food market is absorbed by the fuel 
market because of the corn price’s direct link to the gasoline price; thus, the volatility of corn and 
food prices is reduced due to biofuels. However, this does not hold when mandate is binding. 
The mandate directly determines the volume of the ethanol production and therefore also the 
amount of ethanol-dedicated corn. Any shock in the corn or food market is then absorbed by the 
residual corn and food markets and not by the fuel market. This is because corn dedicated for 
ethanol production is essentially fixed while the residual corn market remains exposed to market 
shocks at the same level as in the case of no biofuels. The shocks will be mainly reflected in 
changes in food production and corn supply for food, leading to corn and food price changes.      
Our results have important policy implications. The price transmission along the food chain 
recently attracted a lot of attention among policy makers (Areté 2012; European Commission 
2009; Vavra and Goodwin 2005). It is often argued that the cause of low prices transmission 
from food to agricultural producer prices is market power of processing industry and/or 
supermarkets. The results of our paper indicate that the biofuels might be an additional cause of 
the reduced prices transmission in the food supply chain.  
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Table 1. Products included in the value of food production using corn 
Products and 
services code 
Meaning of Products and services code Sum of Products 
shipments value ($1,000) 
3112117 Corn mill products 1830037 
3112211 Corn sweeteners 6070174 
3112214 Manufactured starch 2189667 
3112218 Corn oil 992574 
311611A Pork, not canned or made into sausage, slaughtering plants 16379772 
311611G Pork, processed, not made into sausage, slaughtering plants 2137591 
3116121 Pork, processed/cured, purchased carcasses 8296984 
311615 Poultry processing 51150442 
3119194 Corn chips and related products 5807472 
 Total 94854713 
Source: The Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Table 2. Price transmission elasticities (summary statistics for 5000 simulations)* 
  No biofuel 
(benchmark) 
Mandate & 
tax credit** 
Mandate Tax credit No biofuel 
policy 
Corn supply shock (Z1) Central 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 
  Min 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 
  Max 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Corn export shock (Z2) Central 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
  Min 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
  Max 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Food demand shock (Z3) Central 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.35 0.35 
  Min 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.27 0.27 
  Max 0.74 0.80 0.80 0.45 0.45 
Source: own calculations. 
Note: * Standard deviation in each case is between 0.03 and 0.04. ** At the calibration point (baseline). 
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Table 3. The effect of model supply and demand elasticities on the price transmission elasticities 
    
Elasticity of 
corn supply 
Elasticity of 
foreign corn 
import demand 
Elasticity 
of food 
demand 
Elasticity of 
fuel 
demand 
Elasticity 
of gasoline 
supply 
       
Corn supply shock (Z1) No biofuel (benchmark) 0.0103*** 0.00248*** -1.572***  n.a.  n.a. 
  Binding mandate and tax credit 0.0188*** 0.00196*** -1.582*** -0.00038 -0.000187 
  Binding mandate 0.0188*** 0.00196*** -1.582*** -0.00038 -0.000188 
  Binding tax credit 0.00221*** 0.000231*** -1.544*** 0.00457*** 0.00497*** 
  No biofuel policy 0.00221*** 0.000231*** -1.544*** 0.00457*** 0.00497*** 
              
Corn export shock (Z2) No biofuels (benchmark) 0.00322*** 0.000404*** -1.530***  n.a.  n.a. 
  Binding mandate and tax credit 0.00269*** 0.000302*** -1.527*** -0.000343 -0.000157 
  Binding mandate 0.00269*** 0.000302*** -1.527*** -0.000343 -0.000157 
  Binding tax credit 0.000517** 8.81E-06 -1.521*** 0.000421 0.000632** 
  No biofuel policy 0.000517** 8.81E-06 -1.521*** 0.000421 0.000632** 
              
Food demand shock (Z3) No biofuels (benchmark) -0.325*** -0.0893*** 0.234***  n.a.  n.a. 
  Binding mandate and tax credit -0.484*** -0.0439*** 0.0598*** -0.00118 -0.000575 
  Binding mandate -0.484*** -0.0439*** 0.0598*** -0.00121 -0.000558 
  Binding tax credit -0.131*** -0.0167*** 0.00592*** -0.320*** -0.349*** 
  No biofuel policy -0.131*** -0.0167*** 0.00592*** -0.320*** -0.349*** 
Source: own calculations. 
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by OLS regression. The demand elasticities were converted to positive values for an easier interpretation. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; n.a. – not available
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Table 4. Food and corn price changes due to market shocks under various policy regimes (%)  
(summary statistics for 5000 simulations)* 
  No biofuel (benchmark) 
Mandate & 
tax credit Mandate Tax credit 
No biofuel 
policy 
    Food Corn Food Corn Food Corn Food Corn Food Corn 
Corn supply shock(Z1) Central 10.6 12.7 13.6 16.3 13.6 16.3 4.6 5.4 4.6 5.4 
  Min 6.5 8.2 8.8 11.0 8.8 11.0 3.0 3.7 3.0 3.7 
  Max 22.2 25.2 34.3 39.1 34.3 39.1 7.6 8.5 7.6 8.5 
                        
Corn export shock (Z2) Central 2.6 3.1 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.3 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 
  Min 1.7 2.1 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
  Max 5.6 6.3 4.4 4.9 4.4 4.9 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.3 
                        
Food demand shock (Z3) Central 46.4 28.2 48.4 30.3 48.4 30.3 28.2 9.7 28.2 9.7 
  Min 33.4 16.8 35.8 19.4 35.8 19.4 23.8 6.4 23.8 6.4 
  Max 87.0 64.4 110.0 87.1 110.0 87.0 38.7 16.7 38.7 16.7 
Source: own calculations 
* Standard deviation in each case is between 0.1 and 8.3.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. The Curvature of a Production Function and Elasticity of a Product Supply Curve 
A competitive cost-minimizing food producer solves   
                                                             min ,  . . Cx C P x s t f x q                                                (A1.1) 
where the notation is explained in the text. 
 The properties of  f  , specified in the text, guarantee that it has an inverse, h , such that 
   1f q h q x   . The cost of production can thus be written as  CC P h q . The food producer 
equalizes the marginal cost to the food market price 
                                                          
C qMC dC dq P h p                                                  (A1.2) 
Totally differentiating equation (A1.2) and rearranging, we obtain  
                                                               
 1 C qqdq dp P h                                                     (A1.3) 
 By Inverse Function Theorem, we have 
    1q xh q f h q  
or more succinctly 
                                                                      1q xh f                                                            (A1.4) 
Differentiating both sides of (A1.4) with respect to q and rearranging yields 
                                                                  3qq xx xh f f                                                         (A1.5) 
The supply elasticity of a product is defined as 
                                                                Sf dq dp p q                                                     (A1.6) 
Combining the relationships (A1.2) to (A1.6), we obtain 
                                                                 2 Sxx x ff f f                                                        (A1.7) 
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Appendix 2. Derivation of the Elasticity of the Food Supply Curve. 
Totally differentiating the market clearing condition (2) for the food market, we obtain 
                                                                   x fpf dx D dp                                                         (A2.1) 
Invoking x Cf P p and Dfp f fD D p , equation (A2.1) can be expressed as 
                                                               Df f Cdx dp D P                                                     (A2.2) 
which, after recognizing that in equilibrium fD f , can be rewritten to 
                                                                  Df
C
dx p pf
dp x P x
                                                       (A2.3) 
Totally differentiating equation (3) obtains 
                                                              x xx Cf dp pf dx dP                                                     (A2.4) 
The substation of expression (A1.7) together with x Cf P p into (A2.4) after rearrangement 
produces 
                                                         1 1 1C
S
Cf
C
P x
dx p dx Ppf
dp x dP x
                                                (A2.5)    
Substituting expressions (A2.3) and (14) into equation (A2.5) yields  
                                                  1D S Df f C                                                (A2.6) 
where D CC
C
dx P
dP x
  is the price elasticity of the demand for corn of the food producer. The 
elasticity of the food supply, Sf , is then given by 
                                                         1Sf D Df C
       
                                                  (A2.7) 
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Appendix 3. Price Transmission Elasticities for Shocks in Food Demand and Fuel Markets 
No Ethanol Production  
In this case, we only model the shock in the food demand. Solving the system of 
equations (4) for 3CdP dZ and 3dp dZ results in 
                                              
  
 
  
3
3
2
3
2
3
1
C C
C C
C C
x fZC
fp CP P x xx fp
fZ xx CP P
fp CP P x xx fp
f DdP
dZ D S D f pf D
D pf S Ddp
dZ D S D f pf D
   
       
                                  (A3.1) 
which after substitution into the price transmission elasticity formula (9) and conversion of 
derivatives into their elasticity forms produces the right-hand side expression in (9). 
Binding Blend Mandate 
Solving the system of equations (17) for 3CdP dZ in terms of 3dp dZ , we obtain 
                                                
 
3
2
3 3
x xx fp xx fZC
x x
f pf D pf DdP dp
dZ f dZ f
                                      (A3.2) 
And the explicit expression for 3dp dZ is given by 
                                                                 
3
3
fZ
dp B D
dZ A
                                                         (A3.3) 
where 
      
      
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
' ' 1 '
1 ' '
C C
C C
x xx fp F CP P fp G F
F x xx fp F CP P fp
A f pf D D k S D k D S D
D f pf D D k S D k D
 
  
          
       
 
and 
    
    
2 2 2
2 2
' ' 1 '
1 ' '
C C
C C
xx F CP P G F
F xx F CP P
B pf D k S D k S D
D pf D k S D k
 
  
         
      
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Substituting derivatives (A3.2 and A3.3) to the general elasticity formula (9), and using the 
elasticity forms for the remaining derivatives, we obtain expression (19). 
 From the system of equations (17), for the shocks in the fuel demand, Z4, and gasoline 
supply, Z5, we obtain 
         
4
4
4
2
4
G
G
x GP
FZ
x xx fp GPC
FZ
kf Sdp D
dZ A
k f pf D SdP
D
dZ A


 
 
and      
 
   
5
5
5
2
5
1
1
F
F
x FP
GZ
FP x xx fpC
GZ
kf Ddp S
dZ A
k D f pf DdP
S
dZ A
 
 

 
 
Substituting these derivatives into the general price transmission elasticity formulas for shocks in 
the fuel market 
                                    
4
4
4
BM C
Z
C
Pdp dZ
dP dZ p
   and 
5
5
5
BM C
Z
C
dp dZ P
dP dZ p
  , 
obtains expression (21). 
Binding Tax Credit 
The pairs of derivatives needed to calculate elasticities given by expressions (26) and 
(27) come from solving the system of equations (24): 
                 
 
    
     
3
3
2
3 3
2
2 2 2
3
1 ' '
' '
C C
C C
x xx fpC xx
fZ
x x
xx CP P xx F G fZ
x xx fp CP P fp x xx fp F G
f pf DdP dp pf D
dZ f dZ f
k pf S D pf D S Ddp
dZ k f pf D S D D f pf D D S
 
              
       
                          
4
4
4
2
4
x
FZ
x xx fpC
FZ
kfdp D
dZ C
k f pf DdP D
dZ C
 
 
 and  
5
5
5
2
5
x
GZ
x xx fpC
GZ
kfdp S
dZ C
k f pf DdP S
dZ C


 
where    2 2 2F G C CFP GP CP P x xx fp fpC D S k S D f pf D k D         
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Appendix 4. Calibration of the Numerical Model  
Our numerical models (for individual policies and scenarios) closely follow their 
counterparts specified in the theoretical part of the paper. We use a decreasing returns-to-scale 
food production function f Fx . The first-order condition for profit maximization in food 
production becomes 
                                                                   1 Cp Fx P
                                                           (A4.1) 
 Calculating the ratio CP x pf produces 
                                                              
1
CP x p Fx x
pf pFx


 

                                                    (A4.2) 
This means that the returns-to-scale parameter ε of the food production function can be directly 
estimated from the observed data as the ratio of the value of the corn processed into food/feed 
and the value of the food production. 
The firm’s cost minimization problem for the given production technology yields the link 
of the returns-to-scale parameter, , and the food supply elasticity, Sf  
                                                                     
1
S
f
S
f
                                                              (A4.3) 
 Substituting first the left-hand side of (14) into (A2.7) and then substituting the resultant 
formula into (A4.3), and invoking that f Fx , we arrive at 
                                                        
1
1
1 11
C
C
D D
f C
P
pFx
P
pFx



 


      
                                              (A4.4) 
From (A4.1), we have 1CF P p x
  . After substation of the parameter F into (A4.4) and some 
rearrangements, we obtain 
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                                                          1 11 1D D
C f
  
           
                                               (A4.5) 
from which we can finally express the elasticity of demand for corn for food/food as 
                                                              1
11 1
D
C
D
f

 
      
                                                   (A4.6) 
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Appendix 5. Data Sources (2009) 
Variable/parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
       
PARAMETERS         
Miles per gallon of ethanol 
relative to gasoline λ 0.70   de Gorter and Just (2009a) 
Ethanol produced from one 
bushel of corn β 2.80 gallon/bushel Eidman (2007) 
DDGS production coefficient  γ 17/56   Eidman (2007) 
DDGS relative price to corn r 0.86   r = (PDDGS*56)/(PC*2000) 
Price and quantity link between 
corn and ethanol market k 2.65 GEEG/bushel k = λβ/(1-rγ) 
Ethanol processing cost c0 1.14 $/GEEG c0 = PE - PC/k 
Returns to scale parameter of 
the food production 
function 
ε 0.33   CP x pf   
Share of domestic consumption 
of DDGS ω 0.81   Hoffman and Baker (2011) 
Value of corn supply in value 
of food production φ 0.52  C CP S pf   
Value of corn equivalent 
exports in value of food prod. ρ 0.08  C CP D pf   
Value of (initial) corn used in 
ethanol in value of food 
production 
μ 0.11  EC CP S pf   
          
POLICY VARIABLES      
Blend mandate a α 0.06   α = E/F 
Ethanol tax credit tc 0.45 $/gallon RFS2 b 
Fuel tax  t 0.39 $/gallon Cui et al. (2011) 
          
PRICES         
Gasoline price PG 1.76 $/gallon Gasoline average rack price in Omaha, Nebraska c
Ethanol market price 
(volumetric) Pe 1.79 $/gallon 
Ethanol average rack price in 
Omaha, Nebraska c 
Ethanol market price (energy) PE 2.56 $/GEEG PE = Pe/λ 
Fuel price PF 2.17 $/GEEG equation (10) 
Food price p 1.00   normalized 
Corn market price PC 3.74 $/bushel Cui et al. (2011) 
DDGS price PDDGS 114.38 $/ton d Cui et al. (2011) 
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Appendix 5. (continued) 
Variable/parameter Symbol Value Unit Source 
          
QUANTITIES         
Fuel demand (volume) F 134.37 billion gallons Cui et al. (2011) 
Fuel demand (energy) F 131.14 billion GEEGs F = G + E 
Ethanol consumption (volume) e 10.76 billion gallons Cui et al. (2011) 
Ethanol consumption (energy) E 7.53 billion GEEGs E = λe 
Gasoline supply G 123.61 billion gallons G = F  - e 
Corn supply SC 13.15 billion bushels Cui et al. (2011) 
Consumption of yellow for 
food/feed x  7.45 billion bushels 
E
c Cx S S D      
Consumption of corn-equivalent 
for food/feed x 8.26 billion bushels x = x  + DDGS
H 
Foreign yellow corn import 
demand D  1.86 billion bushels Cui et al. (2011) 
Foreign corn equivalent import 
demand D  2.05 billion bushels D
 = D + DDGSF 
Corn used in ethanol production 
(initial) e 
E
CS  2.84 billion bushels ECS E k  
Corn used in ethanol production 
(equilibrium) f 
E
CS  3.84 billion bushels  1E EC CS S r   
DDGS supply DDGS 1.00 billion bushels DDGS = ECr S   
Domestic DDGS consumption DDGSH 0.81 billion bushels DDGSH = ω*DDGS 
DDGS exports DDGSF 0.19 billion bushels DDGSF = (1-ω)*DDGS 
Food production f 94.85 billion dollars 
The Annual Survey of 
Manufactures (ASM), 
U.S. Census Bureau g
ELASTICITIES   central  (low, high)   
Elasticity of corn supply SC  0.30 (0.00, 0.50) Cui et al. (2011) 
Elasticity of food/feed corn 
demand 
D
C  -0.23  (-0.29, 0.00) equation (A4.6) 
Elasticity of foreign corn import 
demand 
D
C  -1.50  (-3.00, -1.00) Cui et al. (2011) 
Elasticity of food demand Df  -0.09  (-0.12, 0.00) Seale et al. (2003) 
Elasticity of fuel demand DF  -0.26  (-0.31, -0.09) Hamilton (2009) 
Elasticity of gasoline supply SG  0.20  (0.10, 0.50) Cui et al. (2011) 
Notes:  
a The blend mandate is expressed in energy terms. 
b  Renewable fuel standard  
c http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html   
d Short ton (= 2000 lbs)  
e This quantity of corn does take into account the market effects of DDGS.  
f This quantity of corn takes into account the market effects of DDGS.   
g http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/asm/historical_data/index.html  
 
